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Introduction
   Infectious disease epidemics are one of the major 
crises faced by human society. Following the outbreak 
of diseases such as SARS (severe acute respiratory 
syndrome), an emerging infectious disease that shook 
the world from the end of 2002 to 2003, and the 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009, cross-border health crisis 
management has become more important. Mainly in 
Asia, avian infl uenza A (H5N1) infection in humans 
is still being reported, and emerging infectious disease 
epidemics is of concern.
   The early detection of infectious disease outbreaks 
in order to minimize the spread of epidemics is 
central to countermeasures against the diseases. In 
recent years, “syndromic surveillance” has attracted 
attention as a new technology that meets these 
demands. The word “surveillance” is generally used 
when surveying trends in infectious diseases or the 
economy. It refers to the systematic collection, analysis 
and interpretation of data required for the planning, 
implementation and evaluation of countermeasures 
against diseases, through continuous monitoring of 
the situation and trend of disease occurrence, enabling 
the establishment of effective countermeasures based 
on the results of prompt and regular surveillance feed 
back to stakeholders.
   Syndromic surveillance focuses on patient 
symptoms such as fever, diarrhea and vomiting. As 
syndromic surveillance spends less time than the 
diagnosis-based surveillance, it is said to enable the 
early detection of infectious disease epidemics and the 
taking of prompt measures to prevent their spread. In 
a situation where the “improvement and enhancement 
of surveillance” come at the top of the list of 
countermeasures against emerging and reemerging 
infectious diseases, including new infl uenza subtypes, 
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discussed at international conferences hosted by the 
World Health Organization (hereinafter referred to as 
WHO), expectations for syndromic surveillance are 
high.
   In syndromic surveillance, technology to analyze 
information on patient symptoms epidemiologically 
using statistical methods, as well as technology for the 
effi cient collection, processing and distribution of the 
information, play an important role. While allowing 
details of those technologies to be discussed in other 
reports, this article focuses on the positioning of 
syndromic surveillance in countermeasures against 
infectious diseases in humans, describes research and 
development trends and practical application examples 
in Japan and abroad, and extracts future challenges.
What is Syndromic Surveillance? 
2-1 Defi nition and Objective
   Research and development and practical applications 
of syndromic surveillance have been promoted since 
the anthrax cases following the 9-11 terrorist attacks 
in the United States in 2001, as well as the SARS 
outbreak from the end of 2002 to 2003, with the aim 
of developing anti-bioterrorism measures and the early 
detection of epidemics of emerging and reemerging 
infectious diseases-in particular, unknown or rare 
diseases. With regard to the operation of syndromic 
surveillance, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (hereinafter referred to as the U.S. 
CDC) proposes the following definition as the most 
comprehensive and most accepted today[1]:
   Syndromic surveillance is “an investigational 
approach where health department staff, assisted by 
automated data acquisition and generation of statistical 
alerts, monitor disease indicators in real-time or near 
real-time to detect outbreaks of disease earlier than 
would otherwise be possible with traditional public 
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health methods.”
   In other words, syndromic surveillance is “an 
action that captures outbreaks of disease in real-
time or near real-time by focusing on symptoms that 
serve as disease indicators, collecting information 
automatically and analyzing the information 
epidemiologically using statistical methods.”
   According to the Japanese Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare’s description of syndromic 
surveillance in its guidelines for measures against 
new infl uenza subtypes, syndromic surveillance is “a 
surveillance for the early detection of outbreak of an 
infectious disease, through the identifi cation of rapid 
increases in patients with the target disease based on 
the number of patients with specifi ed symptoms prior 
to a diagnosis confi rmation from a physician”.[2] The 
Infectious Disease Surveillance Center of the National 
Institute of Infectious Diseases describes syndromic 
surveillance as “a surveillance of ‘symptoms’ with 
the aim of promptly engaging in the ‘early detection’ 
of epidemics of emerging and reemerging infectious 
diseases-in particular, unknown or rare diseases”,[3] a 
description which explains the objective of syndromic 
surveillance.
   When the above points are taken together, it can 
be said that syndromic surveillance is “to collect 
information on patient symptoms, analyze the 
information epidemiologically by using statistical 
methods, make an early judgment as to any outbreaks 
and epidemics of disease, notify health professionals 
and government organizations of the results, and 
take early public health measures,” and “an effective 
action for preventing the spread of epidemics of man-
caused (caused by bioterrorism) or naturally-occurring 
infectious diseases.” 
2-2 Types
   At the core of syndromic surveillance is information 
on patient symptoms. Symptoms vary, from fever 
to coughing, rashes, diarrhea, vomiting, and spasm. 
Patient symptoms are collected extensively, using 
as sources of information about outpatient visits, 
emergency department visits, medication sales, school 
and work absenteeism, and ambulance transportation.
A worker, for example, wakes up one morning and 
feels unwell, so he takes his temperature and finds 
that it is just over 37ºC. He buys and takes over-
the-counter medication (hereinafter referred to as 
OTC medication)[NOTE 1] such as antipyretics and a 
combination cold remedy at the pharmacy on his way 
to work and during his lunch break, and sees how he 
feels for the day while continuing to work. After he 
comes home, he checks the fl u epidemic situation on 
the Internet. When his temperature goes up the next 
day, he takes a day off work and visits a doctor. His 
symptoms get worse quickly, and he cannot go to a 
medical institution by himself due to severe vomiting 
and diarrhea, so he is transported by ambulance and is 
hospitalized. Syndromic surveillance focuses on each 
behavior that becomes evident with such progression 
of a patient’s symptoms, and uses this as the 
information source for the collection of information 
on many patients’ symptoms.
   Figure 1 shows examples of the sources of 
information on patient symptoms in syndromic 
surveillance.[4] Naturally, these actions of a patient 
or health professionals are not unique to infectious 
diseases, and can be observed in other diseases. 
Specifi cally, it is conceivable that many people might 
develop similar symptoms to those described above in 
a short period of time due to food poisoning, toxic gas 
or radiation exposure. Therefore, in order to determine 
whether a symptom is caused by an infectious disease 
and to make a fi nal judgment as to the occurrence of 
an epidemic, it is necessary to check the syndromic 
surveillance results against the diagnosis-based 
surveillance results (see also 2-3).
   Syndromic surveillance is divided into cases where 
surveillance is based on information sources from 
medical institutions and cases where it is based on 
other information sources. Information sources of 
the former type include outpatient and emergency 
department visits, and surveillance using these sources 
consists of collecting information on the outpatients’ 
subjective symptoms and objective symptoms 
(symptoms that can be observed by the doctor, such 
as a rash, jaundice or bleeding) at the clinic, counting 
the number of patients for each specific symptom, 
and analyzing the information epidemiologically 
(this is referred to as syndrome surveillance for 
outpatient visits). In syndromic surveillance for 
outpatient visits, electronic medical records are being 
[NOTE 1] : OTC (over-the-counter) medication
   medication that is available at pharmacies, 
drugstores, etc. without a prescription. The term 
derives from the way a pharmacist hands medication 
to a patient over the counter at pharmacies and 
drugstores. 
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used increasingly in recent years in order to collect 
information on patient symptoms efficiently (see 
also 2-5). Other information sources from medical 
institutions include prescriptions (out-of-hospital 
prescriptions) processed at dispensing pharmacies, 
ambulance transportation and hospitalization. On 
the other hand, information sources of the latter type 
include OTC medication sales and school and work 
absenteeism, as well as Internet searches for infl uenza 
information, which have attracted attention as a new 
source of information. The major types of syndromic 
surveillance based on the information sources 
described above are shown in Table 1.
   While attempts have been made to carry out various 
types of syndromic surveillance up to now, multiple 
types of surveillance are often conducted concurrently 
at the practical application stage following verifi cation 
tests for each type. For measures against bioterrorism 
and the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 to be described in 
chapter 3, several types of syndromic surveillance are 
conducted concurrently and, based on the results, a 
comprehensive judgment is made as to the occurrence 
of an infectious disease epidemic.
   Meanwhile, it has been reported that the usage 
frequency of each type of syndromic surveillance 
varies depending on each country’s medical 
practices. According to a questionnaire survey of 
U.S. public health departments, of the syndromic 
surveillance types shown in Table 1, surveillance 
for outpatient visits, and in particular, surveillance 
for emergency department visits, was conducted 
the most frequently.[5] The survey showed that 
Prepared by the STFC based on Reference[4]
Figure 1 :  Sources of Information on Patient Symptoms Subject to Syndromic Surveillance
Type Surveillance target
Within medical institutions
Surveillance for outpatient visits 
Number of outpatients for each specifi c subjective and objective 
symptom (fever, coughing, vomiting, diarrhea, rash, etc.), counted 
based on patients’ answers to the doctor’s questions during their 
visit to an outpatient or emergency department and the doctor’s 
observations
S u r ve i l l a n c e  f o r  p r e s c r i p t i o n 
medication
Number of out-of-hospital prescriptions of specific therapeutic 
classifi cations processed at pharmacies (antipyretics, painkillers, 
antibiotics, Tamifl u, Relenza, etc.)
Surveillance for ambulance transport Number of transported patients (by symptom) based on records of ambulance dispatches 
Without medical institutions
Surveillance for OTC medication 
sales
Sales of OTC medication at pharmacies and drugstores (by type 
of medication, such as combination cold remedy)
Surveillance for school absenteeism Number of people absent from school (by symptom)
Surveillance for internet search Number of searches for specifi c key words (e.g.: Infl uenza)
Prepared by the STFC
Table 1 : Major Types of Syndromic Surveillance
Patient’s self-judgment
Actions as 
sources of 
information
Changes in the patient’s actions in response 
to symptoms
Search for information on disease (web clickstream, etc.)
Purchase of OTC medication
School and work absenteeism 
Emergency medical consultation by telephone 
Visit to outpatient department
Ambulance transport
Visit to emergency department
Hospitalization
Prescription medication 
Clinical examination request 
Definitive diagnosis
Fill in electronic medical record during medical examination
Actions of health 
professionals toward 
patient 
Incubation 
period
Outside medical institutions Within medical institutions 
Normal life
Range of syndromic surveillance
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84% of the 43 public health departments conducting 
syndromic surveillance have introduced surveillance 
for emergency department visits. This was followed 
by surveillance for outpatient department visits 
(49%), surveillance for OTC medication sales (44%), 
and surveillance for school absenteeism (35%) (as 
of 2007). The cost of the maintenance of syndromic 
surveillance, according to responses from 18 health 
departments, ranged from 5,500 dollars to 1,000,000 
dollars (median of 95,000 dollars), varying widely 
among institutions. The survey was conducted by the 
International Society for Disease Surveillance (ISDS) 
in 2007. Between August 2007 and February 2008, 59 
U.S. public health departments nationwide funded by 
the U.S. CDC through its cooperative agreement for 
emergency preparedness were surveyed, of which 52 
responded (a response rate of 88%). Of the 52 health 
departments that responded, 43 reported having 
experience of conducting syndromic surveillance.[5] 
2-3 Compar isons with Diagnosis-based 
Surveillance 
   The characteristics of syndromic surveillance 
can be understood well when compared with those 
of diagnosis-based surveillance. Diagnosis-based 
surveillance is based on the names of diseases 
diagnosed by a doctor, such as “inf luenza” or 
“measles.” It has been used for many years in 
international surveys of infectious disease outbreaks 
led by WHO and national surveys in the public health 
administration by various countries. In the case of 
Japan, the surveillance of infectious disease patients 
provided in the “Law Concerning the Prevention of 
Infectious Diseases and Medical Care for Patients with 
Infections” (Law No. 73, last revised as of June 18, 
2008; hereinafter referred to as the Infectious Disease 
Control Law) falls under this category (this is called 
an “Trend survey on infectious disease outbreaks”). 
Since it is based on a definitive diagnosis, it offers 
superior reliability but poor timeliness and fl exibility.
   By contrast, syndromic surveillance excels in 
timeliness as it was developed in order to detect 
infectious disease epidemics at an early stage. 
In addition, as it involves information on patient 
symptoms, investigations are possible even in 
cases where the name of the disease has not been 
determined. Even unknown infectious diseases can 
be detected if any symptoms are present, indicating 
a high level of fl exibility. However, while syndromic 
surveillance can suggest the possibility of an epidemic 
of some kind of infectious disease, it cannot determine 
the actual disease. In addition, since fever, coughing 
and gastrointestinal symptoms are not unique to 
infectious diseases, there is a risk of capturing a mass 
outbreak of diseases other than infectious diseases 
(see also 2-2). In terms of reliability, therefore, 
syndromic surveillance is inferior to diagnosis-based 
surveillance.
   The two types of surveillance described above are 
mutually complementary from the three standpoints 
of timeliness, fl exibility and reliability. When taking 
measures against infectious diseases, it is essential 
that syndromic surveillance is conducted hand in hand 
with diagnosis-based surveillance. 
2-4 Utility and Effectiveness
   The utility and effectiveness of syndromic 
surveillance, in reality, are likely to be largely affected 
by the public health management systems of each 
country or region. However, there are few reports 
of systematic analysis methods which measure the 
utility value of syndromic surveillance and their 
results. Here, I will refer to part of the results of the 
questionnaire survey of U.S. public health departments 
described in 2-2 as an example that demonstrates the 
practical capability of syndromic surveillance (Figure 
2).[5]
   Looking at Figure 2, in terms of monitoring larger 
areas and monitoring infl uenza, 80% and 92% of the 
respondents, respectively, reported that syndromic 
surveillance was “highly useful” or “somewhat 
useful.” This indicates that U.S. public health 
departments evaluate highly the utility of syndromic 
surveillance in monitoring larger areas and monitoring 
influenza. On the other hand, their evaluations of 
syndromic surveillance for small outbreak detection 
were low. The ratings were similar for areas with four 
years or more of experience in conducting syndromic 
surveillance and those with fewer years of such 
experience. Therefore, it is likely that the results refl ect 
the intrinsic adequacy of syndromic surveillance, 
regardless of the amount of skill required.
   The utility and effectiveness of syndromic 
surveillance also differ depending on the types of 
syndromic surveillance described in Table 1. While 
various evaluations are available, here, the findings 
based on a report by Yan et al. are summarized in 
Table 2.[6] Since the advantages and weaknesses in 
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the table are provided from a feasibility perspective, 
please check against the operation overview described 
in 2-5 below with respect to surveillance for outpatient 
visits.
2-5 System Organization and Operation Overview
   The operational process of syndromic surveillance 
consists of three steps: 1) selecting the information 
source of symptoms and collecting information; 2) 
analyzing the collected information and, based on the 
results, judging the likelihood of an infectious disease 
epidemic; and 3) notifying health professionals and 
government organizations in charge of measures 
against infectious diseases of the result of 2). 
These steps are common to all types of syndromic 
surveillance. 
   However, since infectious disease epidemics come 
in various forms depending on the microbiological 
characteristics of pathogens and the environment of 
the outbreak area, and since syndromic surveillance 
utilizes various information sources, the information 
collection and analysis algorithms are diverse. The 
main objective of basic research on syndromic 
surveillance is to establish these algorithms, and 
various research fi ndings have been reported in Japan 
and abroad.
   In the following, I will outline the operations 
involved by taking the example of surveillance for 
outpatient visits under trial operation by the National 
Institute of Infectious Diseases (Figure 3).[7]
   In the example of Figure 3, information is collected 
for symptoms of fever, respiratory symptoms such 
as coughing and breathing difficulties, diarrhea, 
vomiting, and rashes. In Step 1, information on these 
symptoms is extracted and collected from medical 
data entered in the electronic medical records of 
designated medical institutions. If the information 
on symptoms is stored in text format in electronic 
medical records, words describing symptoms can 
be extracted by using the full text search function. 
0 50 100
Ad hoc analyses
Small outbreak detection*
Highly useful
Somewhat useful
Undecided
Not useful
Larger area trend monitoring*
Monitoring influenza
Prepared by the STFC based on Reference[5]
Figure 2 : Results of Questionnaire Survey of U.S. Public Health Departments on the Utility of Syndromic 
Surveillance
* “Larger area” refers to city, county, or state, and “small outbreak detection” refers to detecting events within families, 
nursing homes, day care centers, or geographic areas defi ned by a postal zip code. 
 Specifi city* Timeliness* Advantages  Weaknesses
S u r v e i l l a n c e 
f o r  o u t p a t i e n t 
visits (outpatient 
and emergency 
departments)
High Medium to High Ro u t i n e l y  g e n e r a te d ;  o f t e n available in electronic format
Diffi culty of searching keywords of symptoms 
(due to misspel l ings and abbreviat ions, 
deletions of negative words, and vocabulary 
differences across medical institutions for the 
same symptoms)
Surveillance for 
OTC medication 
sales
High to 
Medium High
P r o v i d i n g  e a r l y  s i g n s  a n d 
indicat ions more t imely than 
pat ient v is i ts;  data rout ine ly 
g e n e r a te d  a n d  ava i l a b l e  i n 
electronic format
Addit ional information about medicat ion 
p u r c h a s e r s  i s  u n k n o w n  ( i n q u i r y  a n d 
investigation after a symptom has been found 
are diffi cult)
Surveillance for 
school  or  work 
absenteeism
Low to 
Medium High Timely Lack of disease characterization
Prepared by the STFC based on Reference[6]
Table 2 : Characteristics of Each Syndromic Surveillance Type
* These are comparisons among syndromic surveillance types indicated in the left column, not comparisons with surveillance based 
on defi nitive diagnosis.
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If symptom words are included, they are extracted 
as one patient case. The removal of negative words 
is important; for example, in the case of fever, by 
processing negative phrases such as “fever: none,” “no 
fever,” “no fever either,” and “fever (-),” only those 
patients who have the symptom are counted. Patient 
data other than symptom information are limited to 
age and gender, and other information that leads to the 
identifi cation of the individual, such as name, address 
and health insurance card number, are not collected. 
Furthermore, information collection and extraction 
are conducted within the medical institution, and only 
the data of the counted number of patient cases are 
used for analysis in the following steps. Thus, this 
operational process is based on the concept of personal 
information protection.
   In Step 2, the collected data are analyzed. Figure 
3 uses an analysis program developed in basic 
epidemiological research.[8] Based on various past 
infectious disease outbreak trends, this program sets 
past epidemic patterns as a baseline by applying a 
multivariate analysis that adds seasonal and day-
of-the-week factors (it also takes into consideration 
whether the day falls after a holiday). Cases where 
the number of patients who have actually developed 
symptoms is signifi cantly higher than the baseline are 
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Clinic S
Information on symptoms 
is extracted and collected
Information of EMR
Fully
Automatic
T h e  c o un te d  num b e r  o f 
patient cases 
NIID Outbreak Detection 
program (NODp)
‘Detection of epidemics’ distribution screen 
(Internet server)
Local health 
center NIID Hospital C Clinic K
Source: Infectious Disease Surveillance Center, National Institute of Infectious Diseases[7]
Figure 3 : System Chart of Syndromic Surveillance for outpatient visits
NIID: National Institute of Infectious Diseases, EMR: Electronic medical records
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considered abnormal and are indicated in three alert 
levels: low, medium and high. As can be seen from the 
program, the objective of this analysis is to detect at an 
early stage epidemics that deviate from past infectious 
disease epidemic patterns. Explained in terms of a 
specific infectious disease, the annual epidemic of 
seasonal infl uenza, for example, is not considered an 
abnormal infectious disease epidemic as it does not 
show deviations from past epidemic patterns.
   In Step 3, only the number of patients obtained in 
Step 1 and the alert information obtained in Step 2 
are automatically extracted and sent to an Internet 
server. The number of patients, alert information and 
epidemic detection information gathered in the server 
are posted on the website. The system developed by 
the National Institute of Infectious Diseases uses a 
VPN (Virtual Private Network) for data transmission 
and reception, and an SSL (Secure Socket Layer) for 
sending out information. 
   After Step 3, based on the epidemic detection 
information described above, public health department 
officials will judge whether to collect more detailed 
information and, in some cases, will make inquiries 
at medical institutions. Depending on the response 
to the inquiry, concrete action may follow, such as 
local institutes of health taking patient specimens and 
conducting microbiological examinations. If further 
epidemics are confirmed, the relevant government 
organizations will take steps to prevent a spread of 
the epidemic, such as issuing requests to refrain from 
using and operating public transport and from holding 
meetings. Since these judgments and measures cannot 
be automated, it is necessary to seek the judgment of 
infectious disease experts.
Research and Development 
of Syndromic Surveillance and 
Attempts toward Its Practical 
Applicat ion :  Domestic and 
International Developments
   Here, I will introduce research and development 
of syndromic surveillance and practical examples 
in Japan and abroad, and consider its utility and 
effectiveness with respect to measures against 
infectious diseases.
3-1 Global Trends
   Research and development in syndromic 
surveillance was triggered by the anthrax cases 
following the 9-11 terrorist attacks in the United 
States in 2001, as well as the SARS outbreak from 
the end of 2002 to 2003. Furthermore, WHO’s 
revised International Health Regulations (hereinafter 
referred to as IHR2005), which entered into force in 
June 2007, require timely reporting and action in the 
event of public health emergencies of international 
concern, including infectious disease epidemic and 
mass outbreaks of disease caused by chemicals and 
radioactive materials,[9] and expectations of syndromic 
surveillance are growing as a way of meeting this 
requirement. 
   By country, efforts being made in the United 
States toward practical applications are prominent. 
Yan et al. reviewed about 200 publications released 
between 1997 and 2006, and found that 12 syndromic 
surveillance systems, including the U.S. CDC’s 
BioSense and EARS (Early Aberration Reporting 
System), and RODS (Real-time Outbreak and 
Disease Surveillance), run jointly by the University 
of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University, were 
reported as nationwide-level syndromic surveillance 
systems as of 2008.[6] According to the nationwide 
questionnaire survey conducted by Lori et al. in the 
United States in 2009 (to which 41 of the 50 states 
responded), of the above systems, the most widely 
adopted system was BioSense (20.61%), followed 
by RODS (13.39%).[10] At local and state levels, 18 
syndromic surveillance system implementations, such 
as projects run by New York City and the State of 
Michigan, have been reported.[6] 
   Syndromic surveillance in the United States, 
overall, is mainly aimed at fighting bioterrorism. 
Following the above-mentioned anthrax cases in 2001, 
a nationwide campaign against bioterrorism has been 
implemented, based on the Public Health Security 
and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 
2002, and Biodefense for the 21st Century, a homeland 
security executive order issued in April 2004. In the 
latter executive order, in particular, “Surveillance 
and Detection” is one of the pillars of the biodefense 
program, and practical application of syndromic 
surveillance has been promoted as part of efforts to 
improve relevant systems. Additionally, in recent 
years, syndromic surveillance applications have 
expanded to include measures at state, local and city 
levels against norovirus infection, which is raising 
concerns about an epidemic in the United States, as 
3
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well as measures against new influenza subtypes. 
National, local and state public health departments are 
conducting multiple syndromic surveillance systems 
concurrently to make a comprehensive judgment on 
the occurrence of an infectious disease epidemic.
   Other than the United States, practical applications 
or trial operations of syndromic surveillance have been 
launched in the UK, Canada, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Australia, France, Japan, etc. Like the United States, 
they have conducted various syndromic surveillance 
systems with the chief aim of fighting bioterrorism, 
new influenza subtypes, and infectious diseases that 
present gastrointestinal symptoms such as norovirus 
infection. Examples of syndromic surveillance as anti-
bioterrorism measures that have been published in 
implementation reports and academic papers include: 
the G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit in Japan in July 
2008; U.S. President Barack Obama’s visit to Japan in 
November 2009; the FIFA World Cup held in Japan 
and South Korea from May to June 2002; and the G8 
summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, in July 2005. Table 
3 summarizes syndromic surveillance systems other 
than those related to anti-bioterrorism measures (except 
for the United States and cases described in 3-2 and 
3-3). These are conducted at national or international 
levels.
  Surveillance Responsible body Network  Surveillance target
National level
 
 
 
 
 
 QSurveillance® British Health Protection 
Agency, Egton Medical 
Information Systems Ltd., 
University of Nottingham
Over 3,000 pract ices 
nationwide (as of 2009)
I n f l u e n z a - l i k e  s y m p t o m s , 
r e s p i r a t o r y  s y m p t o m s , 
gastrointestinal symptoms, etc. 
French Syndromic 
Surveillance System 
French Institute for Public 
Health Surveillance (Institut 
de Veille Sanitaire, InVS)
98 hospitals  in France 
a n d  f o u r  o v e r s e a s 
departments (OSCOUR 
Network; as of 2007)
I n f l u e n z a - l i k e  s y m p t o m s , 
r e s p i r a t o r y  s y m p t o m s ,  a n d 
gastrointestinal symptoms
A l t e r n a t i v e 
Sur ve i l lance A ler t 
Project (ASAP)
Health Canada Canadian Association 
of Chain Drug Stores 
(CACDS) member stores
S a l e s  o f  a n t i d i a r r h e a l  a n d 
a n t i n a u s e a  OTC m e d i c a t i o n 
(gastrointestinal symptoms)
Australian Sentinel 
Practices Research 
Network (ASPREN)
Royal Australian College 
of General Practit ioners 
(R ACGP), Universi ty of 
Adelaide
More than 100 general 
practitioners nationwide 
(as of 2009)
I n f l u e n z a - l i k e 
s y m p t o m s , g a s t r o i n t e s t i n a l 
symptoms and other  spec i f i c 
symptoms
E m e r g e n c y 
D e p a r t m e n t 
Information System in 
Korea
Korea Centers for Disease 
Contro l and Prevent ion 
(Korea CDC)
125 sentinel hospitals (as 
of 2008)
Acute respiratory symptoms
Taiwan's Respiratory 
S y n d r o m i c 
Surveillance System 
(RSSS)
Centers for Disease Control 
(Taiwan) (Taiwan CDC)
18 9 hosp i t a l s  (as  o f 
2005)
I n f l u e n z a - l i k e  s y m p t o m s , 
respiratory symptoms, etc.
I n te r na t i ona l 
level 
 
 
 
E a r l y  W a r n i n g 
Outbreak Recognition 
System (EWORS)
U . S .  N a v a l  M e d i c a l 
R e s e a r c h  U n i t  T w o 
(NAMRU-2)
P u b l i c  h e a l t h 
departments and medical 
institutions of Indonesia, 
Cambod ia ,  V ie tnam, 
Laos and South Korea 
Symptoms of infectious disease 
registered in ICD*1 or arbitrarily-
found symptoms 
D i S T R I B u T E 
(Distribute Syndromic 
Surveillance Project)
International Society for 
D i s e a s e  S u r v e i l l a n c e 
(ISDS) 
U.S. CDC, U.S. Public 
H e a l t h  I n f o r m a t i c s 
Institute (PHII), Markle 
Foundation
Infl uenza-like symptoms
S I D A R T H a  ( t h e 
Em e r g e n c y  D a t a -
based  Sys tem fo r 
I n f o r m a t i o n  o n , 
D e t e c t i o n  a n d 
Analysis of Risks and 
Threats to Health)
European Commission co-
funded project (June 2008 - 
December 2010)
P u b l i c  h e a l t h 
d e p a r t m e n t s  a n d 
medical institutions of 
12 European countries 
(project group), as well 
as  an adv iso r y  body 
comprising of f icials of 
the European Centre 
for Disease Prevention 
and Control (ECDC) and 
WHO
Inf luenza - l i ke  symptoms and 
symptoms of  o ther in fec t ious 
diseases
Prepared by the STFC
Table 3 : Major National and International Syndromic Surveillance Systems (Except the United States and Cases in 3-2 
and 3-3)
*¹ The International Classification of Diseases (ICD), recommended by the WHO, was first created in 1900 in order to establish 
an international standard of classification for causes of death, and has since been revised approximately every 10 years (the 
latest is ICD-10). “Certain infectious and parasitic diseases” are registered and are classifi ed into intestinal infectious diseases, 
tuberculosis, sepsis, viral hepatitis, human immunodefi ciency virus (HIV) disease and other diseases.
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   Most syndromic surveillance systems are run 
by government organizations in charge of public 
health management and national research institutes, 
or jointly conducted between those organizations 
and universities. A certain degree of involvement 
from government organizations is considered to 
be necessary in order to take steps as promptly 
as possible, based on the results of syndromic 
surveillance, to prevent the spread of an infectious 
disease epidemic, such as issuing requests to refrain 
from using and operating public transport.
3-2 Syndromic Surveillance for prescription 
medications and School Absenteeism 
   In the following, I will refer to cases of syndromic 
surveillance conducted in Japan during the pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 outbreak  and analyze how the 
surveillance led to the early detection of the epidemic. 
I will also evaluate the consistency of the results 
between syndromic surveillance and diagnosis-
based surveillance. Furthermore, I will introduce 
surveillance for Internet search as an example of 
recently developed syndromic surveillance. While 
syndromic surveillance, as described previously, 
is used widely as an anti-bioterrorism measure, 
this article, instead of referring to cases based on 
hypothetical infectious disease epidemics, will look 
at cases of infectious disease epidemics that actually 
occurred. 
   In April 2009, a new influenza subtype, whose 
outbreak was fi rst reported in Mexico, spread rapidly 
across the world and, on June 12, 2009. WHO raised 
its alert level to Phase 6, the pandemic phase. Since an 
infl uenza pandemic is believed to occur in 10- to 40-
year cycles from past cases of the Spanish fl u, Asian 
fl u and Hong Kong fl u, WHO member countries had 
prepared an action plan for countermeasures even 
before the pandemic (H1N1) 2009.
   In Japan, the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 
Action Plan was formulated by the Inter-ministerial 
Avian Influenza Committee in December 2005, 
followed by the enforcement in May 2008 of the 
Law on Partial Revision of the Law Concerning the 
Prevention of Infectious Diseases and Medical Care 
for Patients with Infections and the Quarantine Act 
(Act No. 30 of 2008). The amended law created a 
new classifi cation called “Pandemic human infl uenza 
and relevant infections,” enhancing surveillance 
systems for a possible infl uenza pandemic. The above 
action plan, revised in February 2009, places great 
importance on the role of syndromic surveillance[11]: 
“It is extremely important to detect an outbreak of 
new influenza subtype as early as possible through 
surveillance, and prevent the spread of infection to 
minimize damage.”
   During the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 outbreak in 
Japan, syndromic surveillance was put to practical 
use by the National Institute of Infectious Diseases. 
The institute had been conducting research and 
development in surveillance for outpatient visits, 
ambulance transport, prescription medication, OTC 
medication sales, and school absenteeism prior to the 
pandemic as measures against various public health 
crises of international concern required by IHR2005 
(FY2007-FY2009; “Empirical study on early detection 
of local health crisis management information and 
information sharing systems including government 
organizations” as part of a multidisciplinary research 
project on health and safety crisis management 
measures under the health science and labour research 
grant from Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare; 
research representative Dr. Yasushi Ohkusa). As part 
of the research and development effort, surveillance 
systems for prescription medication and school 
absenteeism attributable to new influenza subtype 
were established and their effectiveness and utility 
were tested during the pandemic H1N1 2009 outbreak 
(as of March 2010, both of the surveillance systems 
are in progress).
   Surveillance for prescription medication, as 
described in Table 1, is based on the number of 
prescriptions issued for each specific therapeutic 
classifi cation. In Japan, the out-of-hospital prescription 
rate exceeds 50% and the computerization rate of 
dispensing pharmacies is high. The out-of-hospital 
prescription rate was 59.3% in a 2008 survey (2008 
Social healthcare survey by medical action; Social 
Statistics Division, Statistics and Information 
Department, Minister’s Secretariat, Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare), and the computerization 
rate of dispensing pharmacies stood at 98.9% as of 
July 2009 (the Trend of Medical Care Expenditures 
Pharmacies (Pharmacies dispensing expenditures); 
Actuarial Research Division, Health Insurance 
Bureau, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare). 
By using prescription data, information on many 
patients can be obtained and, since the data are mostly 
computerized, automatic data collection is possible. 
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A: Graph showing epidemic progression B: Map showing daily nationwide epidemic levels
C: Relationship between the estimated number of patients obtained by 
syndromic surveillance and data from diagnosis-based surveillance
The epidemic information is provided in Japanese.
Figure 4 : Information Provided in Surveillance for prescription Medication
Source: Infectious Disease Surveillance Center, National Institute of Infectious Diseases[12]
Number of 
suspected
Patients
Week
Figure 5 : Information Provided in Surveillance for School Absenteeism 
Source: Infectious Disease Surveillance Center, National Institute of Infectious Diseases
(Group conference material pertaining to the research project of Reference[13])
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When the therapeutic classifi cation of antiviral drugs 
for influenza is selected, for example, the number 
of prescriptions will correspond one on one to the 
number of suspected influenza patients, thus it is 
likely to provide a highly accurate surveillance result. 
Surveillance for prescription medication as a 
countermeasure against the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
has been conducted in earnest by the National 
Institute of Infectious Diseases since April 20, 2009. 
Specifically, the number of prescriptions of, mainly, 
Tamiflu® and Relenza®, both antiviral drugs for 
influenza, is being monitored at 4,042 pharmacies 
nationwide (as of April 10, 2010; equivalent to 
approximately 9% of all pharmacies in Japan) that 
gathers out-of-hospital prescription data by ASP 
(Application Service Provider). The monitored data 
are distributed to health professionals next day in the 
form of information collection and analysis results. 
Thus, it can be said that this enables almost real-time 
detection of an infectious disease epidemic. Figure 4 
shows examples of information distributed to health 
professionals.[12] 
   According to the results up to the end of December 
2009, 38 prefectures reported a high positive 
correlation between the estimated number of patients 
obtained by surveillance for prescription medication 
and the actual number of patients obtained from 
diagnosis-based surveillance (a correlation coeffi cient 
of 0.9 or higher). These results have led to an 
evaluation that the surveillance conducted was able to 
present indicators of the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 ahead 
of diagnosis-based surveillance.[13]
   Meanwhile, the National Institute of Infectious 
Diseases has conducted surveillance for school 
absenteeism in earnest since September 2009.[13] In the 
surveillance for school absenteeism, the absenteeism 
situation of all students suffering from fever, 
headaches, acute respiratory symptoms, diarrhea and 
abdominal pain, nausea and vomiting, rashes, and 
influenza-like symptoms were monitored in a total 
of 9,000 elementary, junior high and high schools, 
equivalent to 19% of all schools in Japan (covering 
nine prefectures as of February 2010) (Figure 5).
   In January 1-15, 2010, a questionnaire survey of 
participants in the surveillance for school absenteeism 
was conducted. Responses were obtained from 
2,218 respondents including school officials, board 
of education officials and public health department 
officials of local governments, and views such as on 
the usefulness of surveillance in making a decision on 
temporary school closures were heard.[13] However, 
the FY2009 project report notes that there remain 
problems in the surveillance system for school 
absenteeism (see also 4-2).[13] It seems that it will 
be necessary to examine further the intrinsic 
effectiveness and utility of surveillance for school 
absenteeism through future research and development 
and verifi cation tests.
3-3 Surveillance for Internet Search
   In recent years, surveillance of seasonal influenza 
that utilizes Internet search information has attracted 
attention. Such systems enabling the early detection 
of seasonal infl uenza epidemics in the United States 
were made public in 2008 by the University of Iowa 
and other U.S. academic institutions and Yahoo! 
Research,[14] and by Google.org and U.S. CDC.[15] 
The former used search query logs in the United 
States from March 2004 through May 2008 and 
demonstrated that the number of searches containing 
the terms “influenza” or “flu” was strongly linked 
to the percentage of inf luenza-positive cases in 
clinical tests and death attributable to pneumonia 
and seasonal infl uenza. In other words, they found a 
positive correlation between the number of infl uenza-
related searches and the number of patients who 
actually displayed symptoms of seasonal influenza. 
Based on this result, Google.org developed a more 
comprehensive and automated Internet search 
surveillance system, and released an experimental 
version of Google Flu Trends on November 11, 2008 
(U.S. local time; the same shall apply hereinafter) 
(available in Japan by the service name of “Influ-
trend”).[16] It has been reported that, whereas the 
U.S. CDC’s traditional Influenza Sentinel Providers 
Surveillance Network takes one to two weeks for 
information collection, analysis and publication of 
results, the two systems described above are able 
to process information faster. In other words, by 
analyzing the number of search query data related 
with infl uenza, it is possible to estimate an epidemic 
of seasonal infl uenza prior to a defi nitive diagnosis.
   Google Flu Trends[16] is similar to the Internet search 
surveillance system of the University of Iowa et al. in 
that they are both based on infl uenza-like illness (ILI)-
related search queries. However, Google Flu Trends 
covers a wider variety of search terms (according 
to Ginsberg et al., 45 queries related to influenza 
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complications and remedies were established at 
the initial stage of system development),[15] divides 
the epidemic level into five phases, and shows the 
estimated epidemic level by means of maps by country 
or by region and temporal transitional graphs. In 
particular, in deciding on the epidemic level, Google 
Flu Trends compares the estimates based on search 
data against a historic baseline level of influenza 
activity for that area. Data are updated on the Internet 
on a daily basis, and Google Flu Trends releases 
visualized information on the seasonal influenza 
epidemic situation in almost real-time. In addition, 
Google Flu Trends verifi es estimated data from each 
country by using diagnosis-based surveillance data 
officially released by the respective public health 
management institutions.
   With regard to the handling of personal information, 
Google.org says ‘‘we are keenly aware of the trust 
our users place in us, and of our responsibility to 
protect their privacy. Google Flu Trends can never be 
used to identify individual users because we rely on 
anonymized, aggregated counts of how often certain 
search queries occur each week.’’
   The effectiveness of Google Flu Trends has been 
demonstrated by comparisons with data from the 
above-mentioned traditional influenza surveillance 
conducted by the U.S. CDC. Ginsberg et al.[16] 
compared the data from weekly reports on the 
proportion of patients suffering from influenza-like 
symptoms in nine U.S. regions over fi ve years (2003-
2007) with estimated data obtained from Google 
Flu Trends, and found that the two showed a strong 
positive correlation (a correlation coeffi cient of 0.80-
0.96). In addition, when surveillance using Google Flu 
Trends was conducted in the same nine regions on a 
trial basis during the seasonal influenza epidemic in 
2007-2008, Google Flu Trends reportedly succeeded 
in detecting the epidemic one to two weeks earlier 
than the U.S. CDC’s data release. Furthermore, in 
New Zealand, it has been reported that the peak 
period for the seasonal influenza epidemic in 2009 
was indicated by Google Flu Trends one week earlier 
than reports from general practitioners.[17] 
   Google Flu Trends, only available in the United 
States when first launched in November 2008, has 
since extended its coverage to countries such as 
Mexico, New Zealand and Australia, adding Japan 
and certain European countries on October 8, 2009, 
and covering a total of 20 countries as of March 2010. 
I s s u e s  Re g a r d i n g  Fu t u r e 
Development
 
   As shown in Figure 1 and Table 2, syndromic 
surveillance has a broad information source and 
an extensive coverage area. It can be conducted at 
national or international levels and, as in the U.S. case 
described in 3-1, it can be conducted at local, state and 
city levels within a country. In addition, as shown in 
Table 2, differences in utility and effectiveness have 
been reported depending on the type of syndromic 
surveillance. Here, I will attempt to capture syndromic 
surveillance in its entirety and identify what is 
required for the future development of domestic and 
international syndromic surveillance systems.
4-1 Issues Common to All Systems
   As described in Chapter 3, syndromic surveillance 
has been conducted worldwide in recent years, and 
the types of syndromic surveillance have become 
increasingly diverse. With such widespread use, 
however, various issues with regard to syndromic 
surveillance systems have also been pointed out. 
   Chretien et al., responsible for the U.S. Department 
of Defense Global Emerging Infections Surveillance 
and Response System (DoD-GEIS), raised four 
important issues-1) technical, 2) fi nancial, 3) political, 
and 4) ethical, social and cultural considerations-in 
building syndromic surveillance systems.[18] In the 
following, issues will be extracted in line with these 
considerations. 
   From technical and fi nancial perspectives, the key 
is to collect information on patient symptoms as 
effi ciently and effectively as possible to maintain the 
operation of syndromic surveillance systems. While 
issues regarding information collection, analysis and 
distribution technologies and cost-related issues vary 
depending on the surveillance target, location and 
system, there is room for improvement, in particular, 
with regard to software. Chretien et al., referred 
to above, has proposed the introduction of open-
source software to replace the commercial software 
used in many existing syndromic surveillance 
systems in order to reduce operational costs.[19] The 
proposed software should be compatible with various 
information sources and be equipped with a function 
that can automatically collect, analyze and distribute 
data. In other words, since a high level of usability is 
4
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required, software developers and persons conducting 
syndromic surveillance need to collaborate for 
software creation.
   From a political standpoint, coordination between 
administrative departments of national and local 
governments, as well as cooperation with stake 
holders, is important. In the case of Japan, the 
National Institute of Infectious Diseases, quarantine 
stations, local institutes of health, local health centers, 
medical institutions, and organizations involved 
with the information sources of each syndromic 
surveillance system need to work closely together 
to build a framework for syndromic surveillance, 
under jurisdiction of the departments of national and 
prefectural governments in charge of public health 
administration, school health administration, and 
occupational health administration. 
   With respect to ethical, social and cultural 
issues, greater public understanding of syndromic 
surveillance as a countermeasure against infectious 
diseases is necessary. In particular, understanding 
with regard to information disclosure is crucial. 
While syndromic surveillance is based on personal 
and medical information regarding symptoms, 
information that can identify the individual is 
not released from institutions that possess the 
information source. Persons responsible for 
conducting syndromic surveillance are obliged to be 
accountable to the public in adhering to the privacy 
policies of syndromic surveillance. In addition, when 
building syndromic surveillance systems, it is also 
necessary for the public to cooperate in maintaining 
the flexibility of such systems by refraining from 
overestimating or underestimating specific methods 
and tools. Google Flu Trends, for example, is gaining 
worldwide recognition and is prospective for a useful 
countermeasure against infectious diseases; in Japan, 
however, public awareness of medical services serves 
as a hurdle to its full-scale introduction. Considering 
the differences between Japan and other countries in 
their outpatient care systems, internet search patterns 
of Japanese people may not always be the same as 
those of people from other countries. It is necessary 
to select information sources and verify systems by 
keeping in mind that the utility and effectiveness of 
syndromic surveillance may vary according to its 
location and social infl uences. In the following, I will 
describe more specifi c issues concerning Japan.
4-2 Domestic Issues
   In Japan, several syndromic surveillance systems 
have been developed mainly by the National 
Institute of Infectious Diseases and are at the stages 
of experimental demonstration, trial operation and 
practical application. The following are issues that 
have been highlighted through conducting syndromic 
surveillance.
   From a technical standpoint, the need for further 
consideration with respect to the compatibility of 
data management software has been pointed out 
in surveillance for outpatient visits and ambulance 
transport (sourced from group conference materials 
pertaining to the research project of Reference[13]). 
The two current surveillance systems have been 
developed for software for specifi c electronic medical 
records or records of ambulance dispatches, and are 
not compatible with software that differs among 
medical institutions or fi re departments. With respect 
to electronic medical records, in particular, there 
are cases where different software systems are used 
at different medical institutions or, in university 
hospitals, at different departments, and technological 
development is required to enable the necessary 
information to be extracted from the various software 
systems. To this end, cooperation is needed among 
the National Institute of Infectious Diseases, which is 
leading surveillance efforts, medical institutions and 
vendors of electronic medical records. In addition, 
since information collection is not automated in the 
current surveillance system for school absenteeism, 
the school needs to enter data for each event of 
absenteeism. According to Ohkusa et al.,[13] an average 
of 7-8 minutes is reportedly required for entering data 
under the current system, and further technological 
development is necessary in the future to reduce the 
operation. 
   In view of their future widespread use, national 
and local governments should consider measures to 
incorporate surveillance for prescription medication 
and school absenteeism, which are at the practical 
application stage, into public health administration 
at an early date. Also, in surveillance for outpatient 
visits, the widespread use of electronic medical 
records is essential. According to the Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare’s survey of medical 
facilities (static survey), as of 2008, electronic medical 
records were introduced in the entire facility in 10.8% 
(948 facilities) of hospitals and 13.1% (12,939 facilities) 
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of clinics. While the figure rose 5.6% for hospitals 
and 6.8% for clinics from the results of the same 
survey three years ago,[19] the situation is far from 
being ready for conducting a full-scale operation of 
syndromic surveillance. The New IT Reform Strategy 
compiled by the government’s Strategic Headquarters 
for the Promotion of an Advanced Information 
and Telecommunications Network Society (IT 
Strategic Headquarters) calls for the widespread 
use of electronic medical records and other medical 
information systems in order to improve the quality 
and effi ciency of medical services.[20] Thus, the spread 
of electronic medical records is also desirable from the 
perspective of contributing to improving the quality of 
medical services as a whole through countermeasures 
against infectious diseases.
   Meanwhile, with regard to surveillance for school 
absenteeism, it is hoped that verifi cation of its utility 
and effectiveness will make progress through future 
verification tests. Sites where group activities take 
place, such as schools, are prone to become hotbeds 
for infectious diseases and, at the same time, may 
trigger a spread of the epidemic to the home and the 
community. It is considered to be meaningful, from 
the perspective of public health management, to 
measure the utility value of surveillance for school 
absenteeism.
4-3 International Issues 
   Expectations for syndromic surveillance are 
growing with respect to international public health 
measures promoted by IHR2005. IHR2005 calls 
for an enhancement of measures against large-scale 
infectious diseases, irrespective of whether they are 
man-caused or naturally-occurring.[9]
   In considering measures against emerging infectious 
diseases, it is particularly important to conduct 
syndromic surveillance in Africa’s tropical regions, 
Asia and Latin America where infectious diseases 
are epidemic frequently. Public health infrastructure 
is generally underdeveloped in these areas, and they 
typically lack the experimental facilities for clinical 
research and tests. Therefore, in many cases it is 
diffi cult to conduct diagnosis-based surveillance, and 
syndromic surveillance would become an effective 
measure against infectious diseases. In introducing 
syndromic surveillance, it is necessary to minimize 
the costs of installing and maintaining a surveillance 
system by making use of low-cost netbook PCs, 
mobile phones, and smartphones as a means of the 
collection, processing and distribution of information. 
At the same time, it is important to ensure that 
conducting syndromic surveillance does not interfere 
with existing medical systems. Creating community-
based syndromic surveillance programs and seeking 
the participation of volunteers equipped with public 
health knowledge should be considered so as not to 
place an excessive burden on the limited number 
of medical staff. The consideration of syndromic 
surveillance systems that involve lower financial 
burdens and do not waste human resources are under 
way, and trial surveillance cases of malaria, food-
borne infectious diseases and sexually transmitted 
diseases are being accumulated in the above-
mentioned areas.[21]
   In order to disseminate syndromic surveillance 
globally in the future, including in the above-
mentioned areas, it is necessary to make greater use 
of the syndromic surveillance skills in developed 
countries and existing achievements of international 
syndromic surveillance. It is desirable to strengthen 
the network of experts of WHO and the International 
Society for Disease Surveillance (ISDS), and to 
provide venues for exchanging views and information 
on ways to overcome technical, financial, political, 
ethical, social and cultural issues. In order to advance 
Asia’s public health management system as a whole, 
Japan needs to deepen further its partnership with 
WHO’s Western Pacifi c Regional Offi ce (WPRO) and 
the Asia-Pacifi c Economic Cooperation (APEC), and 
take action such as being more active in providing the 
above-mentioned venues for exchanging views and 
information. 
Other Important Perspectives 
   Syndromic surveillance offers superior timeliness 
and flexibility than diagnosis-based surveillance. 
While its timeliness is obvious considering its primary 
objective, its flexibility is noteworthy in that it can 
also accommodate unknown infectious diseases since 
the name of the disease is not required. In addition, 
the diversity of syndromic surveillance systems 
should also be noted. Various information sources 
are available for capturing a patient’s symptoms, 
and the utility and effectiveness of syndromic 
surveillance change depending on the information 
source and the surrounding social environment. The 
5
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expected outcome of syndromic surveillance is also 
diverse. Surveillance for outpatient visits, by linking 
information on infectious diseases with that on 
other diseases through the use of electronic medical 
records, is considered to be useful for improving the 
quality of medical services as a whole. Conducting 
syndromic surveillance on sites of group activities 
such as in schools is expected to improve public 
health knowledge, understanding and management 
skills within the local community to which the site 
belongs. Furthermore, Internet search surveillance is 
considered to contribute to enhancing Internet users’ 
awareness of the public health situation at national 
and international levels. In general, since syndromic 
surveillance is diverse, the required approach is to 
select the information source in accordance with 
the objective, target, scale, location and changes in 
the social environment, without adhering to specific 
methods or tools, and to constantly explore new 
information sources and embrace them as necessary. 
Considering the need to select valuable information 
sources rationally among a wide variety of sources, 
I would like to emphasize that the flexible selection 
of information sources and a swift evaluation of their 
utility and effectiveness are the two key points of 
promoting syndromic surveillance.
   While the National Institute of Infectious Diseases 
is taking the initiative in conducting syndromic 
surveillance in Japan, it is desirable that other 
related research institutes, private organizations and 
enterprises also take part at the system development 
stage. With regard to the National Institute of 
Infectious Diseases, which has led efforts in 
organizing syndromic surveillance systems, analyzing 
information, making a comprehensive judgment and 
taking public health responses to prevent the spread 
of epidemics, a further enhancement of its role is 
required in the future.
   While this article discusses syndromic surveillance 
for humans, it is also necessary to look at monitored 
data of animals in the future when considering 
measures against emerging infectious diseases. This 
is because it has been reported that more than 
60% of emerging infectious diseases are zoonotic 
infections.[22] Syndromic surveillance for humans 
should be promoted with the aid of data regarding 
Figure 6 : Framework for Syndromic Surveillance in Japan
Prepared by the STFC.
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behavioral abnormalities, diseases and mass deaths 
of migratory birds, arthropods, wild mammals and 
livestock.
   Figure 6 sums up the positioning of syndromic 
surveillance among measures against infectious 
diseases as a whole as well as its future framework, 
and it is clear that syndromic surveillance is applied at 
a very early stage. While it is considered to be possible 
to fully automate the information collection, analysis 
and distribution operations of syndromic surveillance 
in the future, human judgment is necessary for 
taking concrete measures to prevent the spread of an 
epidemic based on that information. In other words, it 
is essential to train infectious disease experts who are 
able to interpret and understand data obtained from 
syndromic surveillance appropriately and swiftly 
prompt public health-related responses.
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